Gafgyt botnets have a long history of infecting Linux devices to launch DDoS attacks. While dozens of variants have been detected, new variants are constantly emerging with changes in terms of register message, exploits, and attacking methods. On the other hand, their new botnets are usually short lived, with most of the C2s watched keeping active for only a few days. In this blog, I will introduce such a sort of variant. The key findings are as follow:
Only 1 vbot1 campaign was seen, with 26 samples captured, as shown by the following honeypot records.
All samples share the same C2
188.8.131.52:2017. Since in Gafgyt it’s common that the same source code will be compiled into binaries for different processor architectures, for simplicity, the following analysis is based on the unstripped ARM sample of
f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde. Compared with previous variants, vbot1 has a more concise main() function because most of its code was moved into 2 new functions named init_vbot() and main_c2_handler().
The function name init_vbot indicates that the author code named their botnet as vbot. It’s responsible for initializing things including watchdog, configurations, and scanner. C2 communications are done in main_c2_handler(), where a loop of connection, registration and receiving command can be found, as shown below.
The characteristic register message template
“ver:%f:%s:%d” is used in the registration block that tightly follows the connection block. From the unstripped symbols we can show that the 3 specifiers separately represent version, bot type and arch. The analyzed sample has version of 4.1.
Actually it’s just the rarely seen specifier
“%f” that caused my attention to this variant because as far as I knew “%f” was not supported by Gafgyt. The original authors borrowed the design of C library functions
sprintf, and implemented a new function named
sockprintf which can generate message according to the assigned string format and send it to the C2. A custom yet simple format controls is done inside sockprintf with “%f” not implemented. That function has been kept by most Gafgyt variants. When firstly encountering vbot’s register template, I imagined a new version of sockprintf. However, that’s obviously not true. To reuse sockprintf but avoid complex programming, vbot author turned to sprintf to generate the expected message then passed it to sockprintf with the supported specifier
Similar to many Gafgyt variants, Mirai code can be found in vbot1. Due to its tight connection with the encrypted configurations, the borrowed code can be well analyzed with the extracted configurations. If you don’t know how to extract, please go to our VB2018 paper. The extracted configurations are shown below, with items annotated with its owner modules.
The commands are hidden in configurations. Except for attacking methods, vbot1 also supports remote update with the command
UPDATE. Another worth mentioning feature is persistence mechanism, which is done by modifying crontab.
It’s strange that vbot1 was spread only once. After its campaign was firstly detected, 35 hours, or 1.5 days, later the first vbot2 campaign was seen from the same download server. Obviously the operators wanted to replace vbot1 with vbot2. The reason might be its buggy registration which always sends a 191-byte register message back to its C2 but only 18 bytes there are really useful, as shown by the following figure.
In total 30 vbot2 campaigns were seen from April 16 to June 12, 2020, with 546 samples captured from 12 download servers. From those samples 13 C2 servers were checked. Detailed analysis shows except the registration code, vbot2 actually differs a lot from vbot1 in terms of code structure, attacking methods and Mirai configuration. The following analysis is based on the x86 sample
f5b0ebebc924e69e34a4ddd145916594. It’s stripped but key function names have been manually restored.
Different from vbot1 but similar to many other variants, vbot2’s C2 communications are done in main(), as shown below.
Nearly the same registration block as vbot1 can be found, with the 3 specifiers holding the same semantics. The analyzed sample has version of 1.5. The loop composed of “loc_804B80B -> REGISTRATION -> loc_804B863” is very similar to previous Gafgyt variants in terms of CFG node number and semantics. The blocks are separately responsible for establishing connection, registration, and receiving commands.
5 attacking methods were checked. All of them have been seen in other variants.
Some vbot2 samples, e.g.,
e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528, have slightly different attacking method names, as shown below.
2 Mirai configurations were found. The only difference lies in the 0x28 item, as shown by the following 2 figures.
From the annotations we can see the Mirai code was mainly used in modules of watchdog, killer, scanner and rand alpha string generation. Since the 0x28 item corresponds to a message to be written to the STDOUT, and the second unprintable 0x28 item is probably caused by a typo from the author.
With the extracted configurations the differences from vbot1 are obvious. They are:
Although those great differences suggest that vbot1 and vbot2 were actually derived from different code bases, I still think they were written by the same author(s) because:
While the filename RHOMBUS was seen 4 times in vbot campaigns, its use in Gafgyt campaigns was much earlier, with the variant called RHOMBUS analysed in . Here I make a simple comparison. In the blogged RHOMBUS malware dropper mechanism was found, with the dropper having the persistence ability across restart by modifying crontab. The dropped binaries, e.g.,
ba42665872ea41e3d2edd8978bc38c24, actually belong to another Gafgyt variant that also heavily borrowed code from Mirai, as shown by the below figure.
From the above configuration we can see that obvious similarities exist between the RHOMBUS dropped binaries and vbot1. I think the most possibility is that vbot1 evolved from RHOMBUS malware with the following modifications:
Other key points about RHOMBUS malware include:
I have introduced a short lived Gafgyt variant vbot. During its 2 month life, 31 campaigns were seen to build 19 botnets. From vbot we can learn that it’s easy for Linux IoT botnet authors to quickly write new variants, which might be due to the fact that dozens of Gafgyt and Mirai source has been leaked online. Once a new variant is written, the behind operators usually will spread it over and over with different campaigns to build multiple botnets. Such patterns have also been observed in other variants and families, e.g., Mirai. To fight such sort of fast emerging while short living botnets, automatic IoC extraction would play an import role for quick blocking or tracking. In VB2020 conference to be held in October, I will give a talk on that topic. I hope it will help you fight against Gafgyt botnets better.
184.108.40.206 220.127.116.11 18.104.22.168 22.214.171.124 126.96.36.199 188.8.131.52 184.108.40.206 220.127.116.11 18.104.22.168 22.214.171.124 126.96.36.199 188.8.131.52
2a141cd2930536f74f51fb57adbb0236 8717baf17660d8e96813ccd99f32c0be cc559b487e1ec18727f37006bd3395e0 f666c3398601cd1b017f8d4556cabbbc 6fb6aaa253c165636ee63a4fdcdb1b9e f422707ac869240bfeea648b6f9b90ad 36997fd129a5ff09311da94c3814379c 790ae71c097662bf6efba92d2d633076 e420df68941cc7ce2d8dd4ba92fd360e 3e36440871a6e39ee87e6d7d1a42155a ae50829a02e5265c590f2fff35e64c52 09ab7435c76df627a813fb75db15ce5d 43ee98318945a475b555045aed4f0e01 e4db8addb5123021e358576157e5e1c0 4147fb0fe442173558f86fe37728ecae 846d6ad9ea86e331f2e071eac6a269de 40b1bf1e415ae508f8a5b831c2f4e994 f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde 98b07b087b98b8d679c9938b16ae4df3 aea960687f0e43b465198be7ffafcf82 3d596d37fe6536a2c759923d920f3e08 52c462f3b22646774219f91bfb44ae66 d2c273e758fd4ac2759ca1d63aafcf6c bbee73ed05730ad95df7a77241207ea5 0f492673eb249fa1209512575040f62d 0e59d4a40bba390314ffa0713b18441c
184.108.40.206 -port 2017
efabd7e734490b9ad12812982347f237 614581bba324c3550a18268a8cb9c221 86310b514c55d31db288a2bb2c1e6114 76d9c69036f1eaac8f7a90eba3a36bfc e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528 d45da804fd35cf502bf942ebfeb64064 90a633f30bdbb2b80642bb229d1605d1 c4391301645cc9df4da3657f4c88f7dc 8bef47e420d0cdf8d0ee69a5d1f5b74c 4c8cdcbaf16f39a461b0bf7052fe1ec3 d936a9226fbbe97993bbe604c8cd5458 125b99cc79808679a7461f1841fd80a5 3b7da3d39db6ec08373c1e4af79aff85 23f764f5f918746b9ffff952dd25cc21 6f24268273573fd5f07cacb00031f1a0 ecae928b4e4093489bd221986da39aba d883d5a2bedf0c3a3da79358c06fa429 3e26626d4563f3199fde498d0ff9fe32 11c1d777b18ffc0f23d2435fdb4645dc ...
220.127.116.11_666 18.104.22.168_1337 22.214.171.124_17911 126.96.36.199_34 188.8.131.52_44 184.108.40.206_666 220.127.116.11_666 18.104.22.168_323 22.214.171.124_666 126.96.36.199_666 188.8.131.52_7331 184.108.40.206_323 220.127.116.11_666 18.104.22.168_107 22.214.171.124_33 126.96.36.199_89 188.8.131.52_1227 184.108.40.206_111 220.127.116.11_1447